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Abstract
Although many studies have reported face identity recognition deficits in autism spectrum disorders (ASD), two
fundamental question remains: 1) Is this deficit ‘‘process specific’’ for face memory in particular, or does it extend to
perceptual discrimination of faces as well? And 2) Is the deficit ‘‘domain specific’’ for faces, or is it found more generally for
other social or even nonsocial stimuli? The answers to these questions are important both for understanding the nature of
autism and its developmental etiology, and for understanding the functional architecture of face processing in the typical
brain. Here we show that children with ASD are impaired (compared to age and IQ-matched typical children) in face
memory, but not face perception, demonstrating process specificity. Further, we find no deficit for either memory or
perception of places or cars, indicating domain specificity. Importantly, we further showed deficits in both the perception
and memory of bodies, suggesting that the relevant domain of deficit may be social rather than specifically facial. These
results provide a more precise characterization of the cognitive phenotype of autism and further indicate a functional
dissociation between face memory and face perception.
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Introduction
Dozens of studies [1] have found that face recognition is
impaired in people with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). But
what exactly is the nature and scope of this deficit? Is it ‘‘process
specific’’, that is, a problem only in remembering faces, or only in
perceptually discriminating them? Second, is the deficit ‘‘domain
specific’’, that is, a problem recognizing faces per se, or does it
extend to all social stimuli, or even more broadly to any category
of visual object? The answer to these questions is important for two
reasons. First, to understand autism itself we need a clear
characterization of its cognitive phenotype/s, as well as a
determination of which features of that phenotype constitute the
causal core of the disorder, from which other features derive.
Second, the fractionation of cognitive abilities in autism can reveal
functional dissociations in the architecture of all minds. Thus, we
tested the process specificity and domain specificity of the face
recognition deficit in ASD by testing each of a relatively large
sample of children with autism, and age and IQ-matched typical
children, on both perception and memory of faces, cars, bodies,
and places.
What does the existing literature say concerning the domain
specificity of face recognition impairments in ASD [1]? In a recent
review, we identified sixteen studies comparing face identity
recognition (henceforth referred to as ‘‘face recognition) to the
recognition of other visual objects in ASD, as needed to test the
domain specificity of the deficit. Twelve of these studies report
domain-selective deficits in which face recognition was more
impaired than recognition of visual patterns [2–4], cars [5,6],
buildings [5–8], Greebles [9], common objects [9], shoes [10–12]
and fans [13]. One additional study of 12 adults with ASD found
that they performed worse than age-and IQ-matched adults with
learning disabilities on memory for faces, but performed at least as
well on memory for cats, horses, motorbikes, leaves and buildings
[14] (That study also tested a group of adults that were age, but
not IQ-matched to the group of adults with ASD. Because of the
possible confound of IQ differences between groups, we do not
consider the results of this control group). Although one very
recent study found impairments for both faces and cars [15], as
discussed further below, the literature overall suggests a selective
deficit in ASD in recognition of faces compared to other
categories.
However, because no study tested a non-face social stimulus, it
remains possible that the deficit in ASD is not selective for faces
per se, but extends to other social stimuli. Thus, in the present
study we contrast the recognition of faces with a non-face social
category: human bodies. Face and body recognition have been
shown to be linked both in behavior [16,17] and in the brain [18],
making body recognition a particularly interesting contrast case to
face recognition. We also tested two other non-social object
categories: cars and places (or buildings). Both categories have
been used in prior studies, which did not find recognition deficits
for these categories in participants with ASD [5–18], but see [15] –
thus we had a strong prior hypothesis that we would not find
differences between ASD and TD groups in the recognition of cars
or places.
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What does the literature tell us on the question of process
specificity of the face recognition deficit in ASD? Our recent
review [1] found that deficits in face recognition in ASD are more
often reported in studies with a high memory demand (face
memory studies; [4,7,13]) than in studies with little or no memory
demand (face perception studies; [19,20]). One study used both a
face memory and a face perception task on the same participants,
and found that face recognition was more impaired when the faces
had to be remembered over a delay than when they did not [10].
However these effects could reflect a greater across-the-board
deficit in visual memory than visual perception in ASD, rather
than a specific deficit in face memory.
Two prior studies tested both the domain specificity and the
process specificity of face recognition deficits in ASD: Hauck and
coworkers explored perceptual discrimination and memory for
faces and houses in children with and without ASD and found
significant interactions between group (ASD, TD), category (face,
house), and group and task (memory, perception) [8]. Children
with ASD performed worse on faces than houses and worse in the
memory task than the perception task. Ewing, Pellicano and
Rhodes compared perceptual discrimination and memory for
faces (upright and inverted) and cars in children and adolescents
with and without ASD [15]: They did not find interactions
between group (ASD, TD) and category (face, inverted face, car),
either for perceptual discrimination or for memory: Children with
ASD performed worse than their age- and IQ-matched peers,
both on faces and cars, and in perception as well as memory.
Thus, the two studies show inconsistent results with regard to
domain specificity and process specificity in ASD.
In the present study we aimed to resolve both questions by
testing both the domain specificity and the process specificity of
face recognition deficits in ASD. First, we crossed task (memory
versus perception) with visual category (faces versus cars, bodies
and places), in a 264 within-subjects design. Second, we used side
views of cars, rather than front views, to avoid any visual
resemblance to faces. Third, we tested a relatively large number of
children (50 with ASD and 50 typically-developing children
matched in age and IQ), to maximize our power to detect any
deficits despite the notorious heterogeneity of autism. Fourth, we
used the same stimuli for the memory and perception tasks, so that
any differential deficits in ASD for memory versus perception can
be attributed to the memory load, not to the stimuli. Finally, we
used stimuli and tasks that have been optimized in a prior
developmental study [21] to minimize floor and ceiling effects,
thus providing maximum sensitivity to any differences between
those with ASD and those without. Based on our recent review of
the literature [1] we predict significant deficits in face memory in
autism that would be greater than any deficits in face perception.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 50 typically developing children and 50
children with ASD aged 5–12 years (6 girls and 44 boys in each
group). We matched the groups on age and non-verbal IQ,
measured by the Kaufman Abbreviated Intelligence Test (see
Table 1). Participants with ASD had an ASD diagnosis from a
clinician and met criteria for ASD or autism on the Autism
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS). A higher percentage of
the ASD children were Caucasian (49 out of 50) than the typical
control children (38 Caucasian, 11 Non-Caucasian, 1 unknown),
so any other race effects [22] would go against the hypothesis of
face deficits in ASD. All participants received modest monetary
compensation for their participation as well as small motivating
prizes. Children with ASD were recruited through the Simons
Foundation and the Boston Autism Consortium. Typically
developing children were recruited from the local community.
Potential participants were excluded if they had any history of
birth or brain trauma, non-corrected visual impairments or a non-
verbal IQ of less than 80. Typically developing participants were
further excluded if they had a diagnosis of any developmental
disorder or any history of ASD in their immediate family.
Ethics Statement
The study was approved by MIT’s Committee on the Use of
Humans as Experimental Subjects and was conducted in
accordance to the principles laid down in the Declaration of
Helsinki. Every participant signed an assent form and a parent or
guardian signed an informed consent.
Standardized Measures
Data from these following standardized measures are presented
in Table 1.
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) [23]: A structured
observational assessment that provides opportunities for interac-
tion and play while measuring social, communicative and
repetitive behaviors that are diagnostic of ASD.
The Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (k-bit) [24]: The K-bit provides a
short and reliable means of assessing intelligence in individuals
aged 4–90. Only the nonverbal subtest was used, testing skills such
as pattern recognition, analogy completion and mental rotation.
Design
The experimental design was the same as a prior study
conducted on typical children [21]. Each participant was tested
in each of two tasks (memory and perceptual discrimination) on
four stimulus categories (faces, cars, bodies, and places). Memory
was always tested before perception so that exposure to the stimuli
in the perception task would not affect memory performance for
those stimuli.
Procedure
Stimuli were shown on a MacBook Pro or Elo touchscreen
computer using Matlab and the Psychtoolbox extension (version
3.0.9, [25,26]). Participant responses were recorded either via
touchscreen or buttons. Some children gave their answers by
pointing towards the screen, and the experimenter pressed the
buttons accordingly. Because these different response devices were
used, we use only accuracy, not reaction time, as a dependent
measure. Participants were tested individually.
The Memory Task
The memory task was conducted in two segments.
Segment 1: faces and cars. In the first segment, participants
studied ten face items followed by ten car items. During the study
phase participants were told to observe all items carefully and to
remember them as best as they could. The experiment started with
a fixation cross which was displayed until the experimenter judged
the participant was concentrating. Then the twenty study items
were presented sequentially at screen center for 3 s each.
Following the study phase was a 2AFC test phase (Figure 1A),
with 10 face pairs followed by 10 car pairs. Items in each test pair
were shown simultaneously side-by-side until the participant
responded which one was ‘‘old’’ (seen previously), guessing if
necessary. Each trial consisted of one old and one new/distractor
item. The old item was on the right 50% of the time. Items in the
test phase appeared in the same order as in the study phase to
Face Recognition in ASD
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approximately equate memory delay across items (about 1 minute
between study and test). No feedback was provided. The
dependent measure was accuracy. Chance is 50%.
Segment 2: Bodies and places. The procedure of the first
segment was repeated for the second segment testing bodies and
places (bodies were first for both study and test).
The Perceptual Discrimination Task
We measured perceptual discrimination threshold (the stimulus
difference necessary to perform 75% correct) in a 2AFC match-to-
sample task (Figure 1B). Each participant was tested on all four
stimulus categories, in the order faces, cars, bodies places. On each
trial, a fixation cross was presented until the experimenter judged
the participant was concentrating. Then the study item appeared
at screen center for 1 s, followed by a test pair presented
simultaneously side-by-side until the participant responded. The
test pair comprised the study item and a distractor created by
morphing the target item towards a different-identity exemplar of
the same category (Figure 1C). The different-identity exemplar
was never a target item, but only a distractor exemplar to this one
target item. Participants were told to report the item they had just
seen.
Experimental trials. The dependent measure was the
morph distance at which participants could discriminate between
the study and test items with an accuracy of 75% correct. This was
estimated using a QUEST staircase [27] with parameters: number
of trials = 30; Beta (slope of the estimated psychometric func-
tion) = 3.5; Delta (estimated probability of a failure well above
threshold) = 0.01; Gamma (estimated probability of a correct
response at zero intensity) = 0.5; Grain (intensity steps, i.e.
minimum morph difference between two images) = 5. Participants
were told the task would get harder as they went along, until they
Table 1. Participant information.
Autism (n=50) Control (n = 50) t p-value
Measure Mean SD Range Mean SD Range
Performance IQ (K-bit) 107.96 15.82 80–139 112.41 12.39 84–140 1.555 .123
Age 9.25 1.81 5.79–12.92 9.07 1.94 5.44–12.55 20.495 .622
ADOS (severity score) 7.08 1.66 3–10 – – – – –
*Note that we were unable to obtain the IQ score of one TD child and the ADOS score of one ASD child.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0074541.t001
Figure 1. Experimental paradigms. A) The memory paradigm. A study phase consisting of 10 items per category (faces and cars, or bodies and
places), each presented for 3 s at the center of the screen, was followed by a 2AFC test phase consisting of 10 pairs of stimuli per category (one
studied, one new). B) The perception paradigm. Perceptual discrimination was tested for the four categories (faces, cars, bodies, and places) via an
immediate 2AFC match-to-sample task. In detail, a target item was presented for 1 s at the center of the screen, and immediately followed by a test
pair of stimuli side-by-side. Each test pair included the target item and a distractor item created by morphing the target item towards a different-
identity exemplar of the same category. C) Morph continua. One example from each stimulus category for the morph continua is shown. There were
ten morph continua per category.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0074541.g001
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might not be able to tell the difference between the two items, at
which point they should guess. Children were told not to feel bad
about not knowing which is the correct one. The correct item was
on the right 50% of the time. No feedback was provided.
Practice trials. At the beginning of each category we used
very easy test pairs (the target item and an 80%-morph distracter)
for practice. Child participants received feedback and encourage-
ment. If children got four in a row correct, the program advanced
to the experimental trials. If a child was unable to complete any
four consecutive trials of 12 trials total, a new practice session
started; if unable to complete any of three practice sessions, this
was counted as the child not being able to perform the
discrimination task (for that particular category – the other
categories were still tried and tested). This occurred in ten
participants (TD children: two for bodies, one for places; ASD
children: one for places, four for bodies, one for faces and one for
faces and bodies). The respective data points were replaced with
the lowest score measured across any age or participant group.
The results do not change qualitatively when these children are
excluded from the analysis.
Lapse trials. Six lapse trials per category were interspersed at
regular intervals among the experimental trials. These contained
very easy test pairs (study item and a 100%-morph distracter) and
were included to make sure children understood and continued to
perform the task.
Stimuli
All stimuli were grayscale, static and not displaying emotion
(relevant to faces and bodies), displayed in ‘canonical’ viewpoint,
and always presented in the same images at study and test. Faces
were natural, real world faces of Caucasian men from the Harvard
Face Database, with neutral expression, in front view, sized
11.137u visual angle vertical611.137u horizontal including the
black background, with no facial hair or glasses, and black hats to
hide hair and ears. The persons shown in Figure 1 have given
written informed consent, as outlined in the PLOS consent form,
to publication of their photographs. Cars were photographs of
typical cars, in side view, sized 7.153u vertical616.63u horizontal,
on a white background. Car stimuli were freely available images
from the Internet and were chosen to allow morphing between
relatively similar pairs. The headless bodies were images of human
adults (50% female) generated with Poser 6 software (Smith Micro
Software Inc., Watsonville, CA, USA), in front view, in constant
pose (i.e., arms out), not expressing emotions, on white
background. The size of the bodies varied between 13.544u and
15.658u vertically, 4.295u and 7.153u horizontally with respect to
the torso width and 17.061u and 19.852u with respect to the arm
width. Places were perspective views of houses missing one wall,
sized 9.25u vertical614.955u horizontal including a shaded
background, and generated with Google SketchUp.
The 20 individual stimuli of each category were paired to make
10 morph continua, by morphing one endpoint exemplar into its
paired exemplar (e.g. one face into its paired face, see Figure 1C)
in steps of 5%. Morphing was realized within FantaMorph
Software (Abrosoft) for faces and cars, Poser 6 for bodies (only
between stimuli of the same gender with same clothing), and
Google SketchUp for places.
Results
Face and Body Memory Deficits in ASD Children
Results for memory (Figure 2) indicate deficits in face and body
memory in children with ASD compared to TD children, but
similar performance for car and scene memory. An ANOVA
including group (ASD, TD) and within-group factor category
(faces, cars, bodies, places) revealed a main effect group, F(1,
98) = 11.349, p = .001, gp
2 = .104, indicating worse performance
in children with ASD in comparison to the TD children, a main
effect category, F(3, 294) = 2.645, p = .049, gp
2 = .026, and
crucially a significant group6category interaction, F(3,
294) = 5.802, p = .001, gp
2 = .056. Follow-up independent sample
T-Tests contrasted the performance for ASD and TD children for
each other category in turn. Children with ASD performed
significantly worse than TD children in face, T(98) = 4.640,
p= .000, and body, T(98) = 2.714, p= .008, memory, but per-
formed similarly in scene memory, T(98) =20.064, p= .949.
ASDs showed a nonsignificant trend of lower memory for cars,
T(98) = 1.665, p= .099, but importantly the deficit for faces was
significantly greater than for cars, as demonstrated by a significant
interaction of group (ASD, TD)6category (faces, cars), F(1,
98) = 5.229, p= .024, gp
2 = .051).
To ensure that IQ differences were not influencing our results,
we re-ran the ANOVA with IQ as a covariate. The group (ASD,
TD)6category (faces, cars, bodies, places) interaction remained
significant, F(3, 288) = 4.742, p = .003, gp
2 = .047.
Reinforcing our hypothesis that memory deficits in autism
selectively affect social compared to nonsocial stimuli, the
interaction of group (ASD, TD)6social (faces, bodies) versus
nonsocial (cars, places) was also significant, F(1,98) = 11.040,
p= .001, gp
2 = .101).
Body Perception Deficits in ASD Children
Results for perception (Figure 3) indicate deficits in body
recognition in children with ASD in comparison to TD children,
but similar performance for face and car perception, and a trend
toward a deficit for scene perception. Note that higher scores
signal worse performance. An ANOVA including group (ASD,
TD) and within-group factor category (faces, cars, bodies, places)
revealed a main effect group, F(1, 98) = 8.474, p = .004, gp
2 = .080,
Figure 2. The memory results. Memory accuracy in percent correct
for each of the four stimulus categories for children with ASD versus
age and IQ-matched typical children. Results indicate a deficit in face
and body memory in children with ASD. Chance was 50% indicated by
the horizontal line. Error bars denote SEM. ** denotes p,.01, ***
denotes p,.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0074541.g002
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indicating worse performance in children with ASD in comparison
to the TD children, a main effect category, F(3, 294) = 12.664,
p = .000, gp
2 = .114, and, importantly, a significant group6cate-
gory interaction, F(3, 294) = 2.731, p = .044, gp
2 = .027. Follow-up
independent sample T-Tests contrasted the performance for ASD
and TD children for each other category in turn. Children with
ASD performed significantly worse than TD children in body
perception, T(98) =23.566, p= .001. Children with ASD per-
formed similar to TD children on face, T(98) =21.371, p= .174,
car, T(98) =20.768, p= .444, and scene, T(98) =21.518, p = .132
perception. Note that the null-effect for face perception is unlikely
to represent a deficit in face perception masked by an other-race-
effect in the opposite direction (given the higher percentage of
Caucasian participants in the typical group and the use of
Caucasian faces as stimuli): In a comparison between groups
matched for race (in a subset of 32 Caucasian children with ASD
and 32 Caucasian typical children), children with ASD still
performed similarly to typical children, T(62) =20.782, p= .437.
To ensure that IQ differences were not influencing our results,
we re-ran the ANOVA with IQ as a covariate. The group6
category interaction remained significant, F(3, 288) = 2.749,
p = .043, gp
2 = .028.
An ANOVA with group (ASD, TD)6social (faces, bodies) versus
nonsocial (cars, places) revealed a non-significant interaction,
F(1,98) = 2.490, p= .118, gp
2 2.025) supporting the conclusion
that the deficits in perception are mainly driven by one category
(bodies) rather than the ‘socialness’.
Direct Comparison of Memory and Perception
Performance
The analyses reported above indicate a significant deficit for
face memory but not for face perception in children with ASD, but
these statistics are not sufficient to demonstrate that face memory
is significantly more impaired than face perception [28]. To directly
compare performance between the memory and perception tasks
we standardized each ASD child’s performance by expressing it in
units of standard deviation from the mean of all typical children’s
performance. That is, we standardized each ASD child’s memory
performance by subtracting the mean performance of the TD
children and dividing the result by the standard deviation of the
TD children, Standardized_scoreASD= (Original_scoreASD –
MeanTD)/SDTD. Correspondingly, we standardized each ASD
child’s perception performance by subtracting the mean perfor-
mance of the TD children from the original score and dividing the
result by the standard deviation of the TD children, Standardi-
zed_scoreASD= (MeanTD - Original_scoreASD)/SDTD. Because
this procedure put scores for both memory accuracy and
perceptual threshold in the same units of SDs from the typical
population, we could conduct direct statistical comparisons of
deficits in memory and perception.
Results are depicted in Figure 4. Negative SD units indicate
worse performance in ASD compared to the TD group. An
ANOVA with the within-group factors task (memory, perception)
and category (faces, cars, bodies, places) revealed a main effect
category, F(3, 147) = 5.754, p = .001, gp
2 = .105, but no main
effect task, F(1, 49) = 0.421, p = .520, gp
2 = .009, and crucially a
significant task6category interaction, F(3, 147) = 5.724, p = .001,
gp
2 = .105. Follow-up independent sample T-Tests contrasted the
performance between tasks for each category in turn. As predicted,
children with ASD performed significantly worse in face memory
than in face perception, T(98) =22.862, p= .005. We did not
observe differences between memory and perception for cars,
T(98) =20.833, p= .407, bodies, T(98) = 0.747, p= .457, or
places, T(98) = 1.620, p= .108. Thus, only for faces did we find a
significantly greater impairment in ASD for memory than
perception.
Face Memory Deficits Correlate with Autism Severity
To assess potential relationships between recognition perfor-
mance in our tasks and autism severity, we ran partial correlations
(partialing out age and IQ) with our face, car, body, and scene
measures of perception and memory (8 measures) and the ADOS
severity score (ADOS CSS; [29]). Face memory performance
showed a trend of a negative correlation with autism severity,
Figure 3. The perception results. Perceptual discrimination
threshold (morph-level difference necessary to perform at 75% correct)
for the four categories for children with ASD versus age and IQ-matched
typical children. Results indicate deficits in body perception in children
with ASD. Error bars denote SEM. *** denotes p,.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0074541.g003
Figure 4. Direct comparison between memory and perception
data. Mean across ASD participants of the standardized score for each
participant (i.e., the standard deviation of each participant from the
typical population) for each stimulus category for memory (left) and
perception (right). Values below zero indicate an impairment in ASD. **
denotes p,.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0074541.g004
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r =2.277, df = 45, p= .060 indicating better face memory
performance in less severely affected children. Puzzlingly, body
perception threshold was negatively correlated with autism
severity, r =2.298, df = 45, p= .042, indicating better body
discrimination performance in more severely affected children,
and raising questions about the interpretation of the perceptual
deficit for bodies in ASD. All other ps are ..125.
Summary
Our strongest result is a face recognition deficit in ASD that is
specific for memory, not perception, and shows a borderline-
significant trend of a correlation with autism severity. We also find
body deficits in children with ASD, both in memory and in
perception, although neither is correlated positively with ADOS
severity.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that face recognition deficits in ASD
are both domain-specific and process-specific. Domain specificity
is demonstrated by a significant deficit in face memory for ASDs
compared to TDs, in the absence of any parallel deficit for car or
scene memory. Both perception and memory of bodies was
impaired however, suggesting that the relevant domain may
extend beyond faces to include other social stimuli. The process-
specificity of the deficit is demonstrated by the fact that ASDs
show no significant impairment in face perception, only in face
memory. These findings, discussed in more detail below, more
precisely characterize the cognitive phenotype of ASD and provide
intriguing clues about the functional architecture of face process-
ing more generally.
Domain Specificity of the Face Deficit in ASD
Our results demonstrate that the face deficit in ASD is domain
specific: accuracy was significant lower for face memory, but not
for car or scene memory in comparison to TD individuals. This
result agrees with most of the prior evidence [1]. In one notable
exception, Ewing et al. recently reported deficits in both face
memory and car memory in ASD [15]. One possible explanation
of these conflicting results is that the car stimuli in the Ewing et al.
study were front views of cars, which look somewhat like faces and
might be processed by the face system. Future work could evaluate
this hypothesis by testing whether inversion effects, which are not
found for our side-view car stimuli (see ref. [21]), are found for the
front-view car stimuli used by Ewing et al. [15].
In addition to their deficit in face memory, children with ASD
were also significantly impaired in body memory, suggesting that
the relevant domain is broader than faces, perhaps extending to all
social stimuli. Another possibility is that our data reflect two
distinct deficits, one for faces, and another for bodies. The ‘‘two
deficits’’ hypothesis is consistent with the facts that i) the deficit for
faces affects only memory whereas the deficit for bodies affects
both memory and perception, and ii) the face memory deficit
shows a borderline-significant trend of a correlation with ADOS
severity but the body memory deficit does not, and iii) face
memory performance is not correlated with body memory
performance in ASD subjects (r,20.09; p.0.5).
Only one prior study tested body identity perception in autism
using static images, but that study only tested for body inversion
effects [30], which have been shown to result from the face
processing system [17,31,32]. However, deficits in body perception
in ASD have been shown in dynamic ‘‘biological motion’’ stimuli
(e.g. refs. [33–37]; though see ref. [38]). These stimuli depict body
form and motion from only moving dots, but could reflect the
same underlying deficit as that found here with static images.
Perhaps these impairments in visual body representation are even
linked to deficits in body coordination [39] and representation
[40] in ASD.
Process Specificity of the Face Deficit in ASD
Our finding that face impairments in ASD are process-specific
for memory, not perception, accord with our recent review of the
literature [1], which showed that face deficits are more robust in
tests with high memory load (e.g. refs. [4,7,13]) than tests with low
memory load. The three studies testing both memory and
perception in the same subjects all found face memory to be
more impaired than face perception [8,10,15], (One of these [15]
reported impairments in both face memory and face perception,
but the perceptual deficit in that study was small in effect size
(approximately 82% correct in children with ASD versus 86%
correct in TD children from their Figure 4A), statistically weak
(t(78) = 1.93, p,.05, one tailed), and apparently smaller than the
deficit in face memory (d’ of about.65 for children with ASDs
versus 1.25 for TD children, t(78) = 3.56, p,.01).) Although small
deficits in face perception may be found in studies with greater
power than ours, our data accord with the literature in showing
that face memory is more impaired in autism than is face
perception. This dissociation between face perception and face
memory has important implications both for ASD and for the
functional architecture of the face system more generally, as
discussed below.
Implications for ASD
Our findings have several important implications for autism.
First, the face memory impairment found here is particularly
strong because it was hypothesized in advance based on our recent
literature review [1], and because it shows a borderline-significant
correlation with autism severity, strengthening the link to autism.
Might an early-developing deficit in face memory play a causal
role in the etiology of autism? Evidence against this idea comes
from the finding that individuals with congenital prosopagnosia
(whose face memory abilities are generally more impaired than
those with ASD) are not impaired in social cognition [41]. Thus,
face recognition impairments on their own are not sufficient to
lead to autism. A more likely hypothesis is that face memory
impairments are the result, not the cause, of the autism phenotype.
For example, face memory deficits may result from underlying
differences in social interest, or differences in eye movement
strategies. The causal pathways underlying the etiology of autism
may be best evaluated through longitudinal studies of infants and
young children on face memory and other cognitive processes
affected in ASD. It will also be of interest to find out whether face
memory deficits in ASD persist into adulthood, or whether the
deficits reported here reflect a developmental delay that is
overcome later in life.
Second, our finding that both the perception and memory of
body form are disrupted in autism is a new finding not reported
previously. The relationship (if any) of this finding to face
impairments and to impairments in the perception of biological
motion remains to be explored.
Third, our data support the hypothesis that autism is
fundamentally a domain-specific disorder that primarily affects
social cognition (see also [42]). Although disorders of domain-
general processes have been hypothesized to play an important
and even causal role in autism, including deficits in global
processing, dynamic attention, and attentional disengagement,
evidence against widespread impairments in any of these processes
has been accumulating in recent years [43–45]. It is unlikely that
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all aspects of the cognitive phenotype/s of autism will turn out to
be social, but our findings support the hypothesis that deficits in
social cognition lie at the core of autism.
Implications for Functional Architecture
Beyond their implications for autism, our results provide clues
about the functional architecture of high-level vision in general.
Most importantly, the dissociation between face memory and face
perception reported here suggests that these two phenomena rely
on at least partly distinct mechanisms. Further evidence for this
hypothesis comes from our earlier finding (using the same stimuli
and tasks as in the present study) that face-specific memory
develops between age 5 and adulthood in typical children whereas
face-specific perception does not [21]. Further evidence for this
dissociation comes from neuropsychology: In ‘‘prosopamnesia’’,
patients are impaired in face memory but not face perception, but
not in either object memory or object perception [46,47]. Finally,
oxytocin administration specifically improves face memory, not
memory for nonsocial stimuli [48], apparently by affecting face
memory processes not face perceptual processes [49], echoing
earlier studies showing that oxytocin plays a specific role in social
memory in rodents [50]. The brain basis of the dissociation
between face recognition and face memory is not known, but
could reflect either the existence of a distinct brain region
selectively engaged in face memory (perhaps in anterior temporal
regions), or a disconnection between posterior temporal regions
specific for face perception and medial temporal memory systems
(e.g., a disruption of the inferior longitudinal fasciculus).
In sum, the present study elucidates the scope and nature of one
of the most widely noted and replicated deficits in autism: face
recognition. We find that this deficit primarily affects face
memory, not face perception, and we further show that the deficit
is specific to social stimuli. These results further underscore the
well-established domain specificity of the machinery for face
recognition in typical subjects [51]. Finally, the fractionation of the
face system in autism (between perception and memory) provides
an important clue into the functional architecture of face
processing in typical brains.
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